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ABSTRACT
People often behave diﬀerently when they know they are being watched. Here, we report the
ﬁrst investigation of whether such social presence eﬀects also include brain monitoring technol-
ogy, and also their impacts on the measured neural activity. We demonstrate that merely
informing participants that fMRI has the potential to observe (thought-related) brain activity is
suﬃcient to trigger changes in functional connectivity within and between relevant brain net-
works that have been previously associated selectively with executive and attentional control as
well as self-relevant processing, social cognition, and theory of mind. These results demonstrate
that an implied social presence, mediated here by recording brain activity with fMRI, can alter
brain functional connectivity. These data provide a new manipulation of social attention, as well
as shining light on a methodological hazard for researchers using equipment to monitor brain
activity.
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It is well established that the physical presence of
others can alter people’s behaviour. Their social pre-
sence can aﬀect how people talk (Walker, Risko, &
Kingstone, 2014), how much they eat (Herman, Roth,
& Polivy, 2003), whether they yawn or not (Gallup,
Risko, & Kingstone, 2016; Gallup, Vasilyev, Anderson, &
Kingstone, 2019), increase ’choking’ under pressure
(Belletier et al., 2015), and even inﬂuence the eﬀect of
emotional arousal (Yu, Tseng, Muggleton, & Juan, 2015).
One of the central ideas driving this line of research is
that the presence of others increases conformance to
social norms (Guerin, 1986). Early work demonstrated,
for example, that when participants were asked to sort
materials with erotic visuals, they would spend less time
doing so when in the presence of others versus when
they were alone (Weiss, Miller, Langan, & Cecil, 1971).
Interestingly, the physical presence of another person is
notnecessary for such social eﬀects. Evena simple reminder
or cue that one’s performance might be observed or
recorded by technology (e.g. a ‘live camera’) can induce
eﬀects similar to when someone is actually present. Van
Rompay, Vonk, and Fransen (2009) demonstrated that peo-
ple were more likely to help to collect a pile of question-
naires that were dropped by a confederate in a lab when
therewas a security camera in the room, compared towhen
no security camera was present. More recently, Risko and
Kingstone (2011) and Nasiopoulos, Risko, Foulsham, and
Kingstone (2015) discovered that simply wearing an eye
tracker can inﬂuence looking behavior. In both studies the
key comparison concerned when individuals believed that
an eye tracker wasmonitoring their looks versus when they
did not. In actuality, looks were always being recorded by
a camera concealed in a sexually provocative swimsuit
calendar mounted on a wall in the testing room. It was
participants’ lookingbehavior toward the calendar thatwas
of critical interest. Risko and Kingstone reasoned that if an
eye tracker can operate as an implied social presence, then
individuals should alter their behavior to be consistent with
social norms. This is precisely what was found, with partici-
pants rarely looking at a provocative calendar when they
believed that their eyes were being tracked. In contrast,
participants almost always looked at the calendar when
they thought their behaviour was not being monitored.
In the present study we asked if the belief that
a device is recording one’s performance (or not)
extends beyond overt behaviour and can aﬀect one’s
patterns of brain activity. In short, if people believe that
a technology can ‘see’ their internal thoughts, will peo-
ple alter what they think about? Not only do the above
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investigations support this possibility, but a recent
study by Baker, Schweitzer, and Risko (2014) revealed
that of all the monitoring technologies in the society
today – location tracking cell phones, unmanned aerial
drones, data hungry internet service providers – brain
monitoring was judged to be more of a privacy viola-
tion when described as providing access to self-relevant
information.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) repre-
sents an ideal technology to investigate this issue
because it is perceived to be an especially powerful
method for observing the neural correlates of thought,
even by naïve participants (Racine, Bar-Ilan, & Illes,
2005). We used a ‘resting state’ design, where partici-
pants are alone with their thoughts, and therefore best
able to ruminate on the notion that they are being
observed (Damoiseaux et al., 2006; Van Den Heuvel &
Pol, 2010). Speciﬁcally, by deceptively describing some
functional scans as anatomical scans, we manipulated
whether participants believed that their thoughts were
being observed. To preview our results, we found that
even this most simple of manipulations was enough to
cause widespread changes in resting state activity.
Methods
Participants
Thirty healthy undergraduate students from the
University of California, Santa Barbara (age range 18–-
22 years) who had no previous fMRI experience partici-
pated in this study, and were paid for their
participation. We excluded data from one participant
who reported not feeling well during scanning. Of the
29 participants whose data we included, 10 were males
and 19 were females. All participants gave their
informed consent; our experiment was approved by
the UCSB Institutional Review Board.
Procedure
The fundamental manipulation in this experiment was
to sometimes describe functional scans as structural.
We used a two-part design in order to titrate the eﬀects
of interest. As participants arrived at the imaging cen-
ter, they were told they would be participating in two
separate studies, and were introduced to both
experimenters.
Study 1 (Baseline study): After completing a safety
screening and providing informed consent, an experi-
menter informed participants that the study sought to
collect pilot data on brain activity while people are
merely resting in the scanner. Participants were placed
in the scanner and then informed that they would ﬁrst
receive a brief brain scan to ensure that they were
properly positioned in the scanner; and then there
would be two longer scans. One was described to the
participants as a functional brain scan, and the other
was falsely described as a structural brain scan (descrip-
tion order counterbalanced across participants). The
descriptions accompanying these two longer scans
were minimal: ‘This scan will measure your brain activ-
ity’ or ‘This scan will measure your brain structure.’
Besides these scan-speciﬁc instructions, participants
were asked to rest with their eyes open without mov-
ing, and to simply relax. As our main research question
involves how participants’ brain activity changes when
they believe that their thoughts are being observed, we
expected that the diﬀerences between these two scans,
with their brief descriptions, would be minimal.
Study 2 (Mind-reading study): Participants remained
in the scanner, and the second experimenter (identity
randomized across participants) informed the partici-
pants that the ﬁrst study was over, and that they
would be now be part of a mind-reading study that
sought to examine, in real-time, the contents of their
thoughts during a functional scan. Participants were
also informed that, based on previous work, sexual or
otherwise embarrassing thoughts were often
observable.
While we let that information settle in with the
participants, and to enhance the impression that they
were part of a new study using a very diﬀerent type of
brain imaging technique while avoiding measuring
responses related purely to surprise, we ran
a functional scan (described as such) under the guise
of ensuring that the brain monitoring equipment was
working properly (we refer to this as the ‘Equipment
Check’ Scan). We then began Study 2.
In Study 2, as in Study 1, there were two functional
scans, one of which was falsely described as a structural
brain scan (order counterbalanced across participants).
Unlike Study 1, however, by emphasizing the mind-
reading component of the functional scan, we expected
that diﬀerences in brain activity between the two
scans – functional and ‘structural’ – to be enhanced.
We also directly compared the functional scans from
Study 2 and Study 1 in order to further test the impact
of the ‘mind-reading’ frame against a condition where
participants knew their brain activity was being mon-
itored, but without the explicit invasive connotation.
After Study 2 participants remained in the scanner
for approximately 20 minutes, during which time they
received additional scans, including an authentic ana-
tomical scan. After exiting the scanner participants were
given a questionnaire asking about their understanding
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of the two terms ‘functional scan’ and ‘anatomical scan’,
and also exploring if their thoughts had changed dur-
ing the mind-reading scan. All participants were then
debriefed including a thorough explanation of the
deception involved, and all of them consented to
release their anonymized data for research purposes.
fMRI data acquisition
Scanning took place on a 3T Siemens Trio MRI scanner
(12 channel phased-array head coil) equipped with high-
performance gradients. All functional images were
acquired with the following parameters using a gradient-
echo echo-planar imaging sequence (TR: 2000 ms; TE:
30 ms; ﬂip angle: 90◦; in-plane resolution: 64 × 64; 37
axial slices; slice thickness/gap: 3.0/.5 mm; voxel size:
3.0 × 3.0 × 3.0 mm; 180 volumes). Additionally, a high-
resolution structural scan was collected using a T1-
weighted MPRAGE sequence (TR: 1700 ms; TE: 2.97 ms,
FA: 9◦; in-plane resolution; 256 × 256; slice thickness:
1.0 mm; voxel size: 1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0).
Preprocessing and data cleaning
After segmenting the structural images using FSL’s FAST,
white matter (WM) and cerebrospinal ﬂuid (CSF) masks
were created for each participant by thresholding the
probabilistic maps at 90%, registering (using trilinear
interpolation) and downsampling to functional space,
thresholding again at 0.9, and binarizing. WM and CSF
nuisance timeseries were created by using FSL’s FEAT
(v6.00) to carry out an initial round of preprocessing on
the data that included only motion correction and brain
extraction, then taking the unweighted average of all
voxels within the WM and CSF masks respectively. The
functional data were then entered into a nuisance regres-
sion in FEAT, which included spatial smoothing (5 mm
FWHM) and registration using FEAT’s FNIRT tool (warp
resolution = 10 mm). The nuisance model included the
WM and CSF timeseries and the six motion parameters,
plus temporal derivatives for each variable, as regressors.
The residuals from this model were bandpass ﬁltered
between 0.01–0.75 Hz and transformed to 3 mm isotropic
standard space using the transform generated by FNIRT,
and the result was taken as our data for subsequent
analyses.
Deﬁning contrasts
Our main research question involves how social pre-
sence, vis-a-vis the belief that one’s thoughts as mea-
sured by fMRI are visible to others, aﬀects one’s
thoughts and brain activation. We operationalized this
by computing contrasts between scans with diﬀerent
instructions that emphasized this visibility to varying
degrees. Table 1 illustrates the contrasts of interest.
Each of these contrasts was designed to address the
question of what happens under knowledge of observa-
tion, and they diﬀer in terms of the theoretical magnitude
of the diﬀerence between the ‘observed’ (Functional) and
‘unobserved’ (‘Structural’) scans. As noted, we expected
Study 1’s Functional vs. ‘Structural’ contrast (‘Contrast 1’)
to produce the fewest diﬀerences; Study 2’s Functional
vs. ‘Structural’ (‘Contrast 2’) to produce the most; and
Study 2 Functional vs. Study 1 Functional (‘Contrast 3’)
to fall between these two extremes. We also re-ran the
analyses described below controlling for the following
factors: participant gender, experimenter gender, ﬁrst
counterbalance order, second counterbalance order,
and reported understanding of the structural/functional
distinction. All results were qualitatively unchanged, so
we report only the uncorrected ﬁndings.
A priori connectivity analysis
Because we are interested in social phenomena, we
used a set of a priori maps derived from Neurosynth
(Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011)
with relevant search terms to investigate changes in
connectivity within and between several networks of
interest. We used seven search terms, which we later
combined into ﬁve broader processes. The seven terms
we used were ‘attentional control’ and ‘selective atten-
tion’ (which we merged by taking the maximum at each
voxel into a map we refer to henceforth as AC), ‘cogni-
tive control’ and ‘executive control’ (which we merged
similarly into map EC), ‘social cognition’ (referred to
henceforth as SC), ‘self relevant’ (SR), and ‘theory of
mind’ (TM). The Neurosynth search was carried out 6/
25/19. To quantify intra- and inter-network connectivity,
we used a multi-stage procedure to produce nodes
from Neurosynth’s ‘association test’ maps. First, to
make each network mutually exclusive with all others,
we assigned every voxel to the map with the maximum
association test value, yielding ﬁve maps with no spatial
Table 1. Schematic depiction of the three contrasts investi-
gated in the present analysis. n/a: this scan was not included in
the relevant contrast; – : this is the scan that was subtracted in






‘Structural’ Functional ‘Structural’ Functional
1 – + n/a n/a n/a
2 n/a n/a n/a – +
3 n/a – n/a n/a +
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overlap, which were then binarized. Each of these maps
was then thresholded at zero, and the remaining voxels
were extent-thresholded with a minimum extent of 33
voxels (66 mm3), which was chosen heuristically based
on the distributions of cluster sizes across all maps.
Finally, each cluster was downsampled to match func-
tional resolution using trilinear interpolation.
This procedure resulted in a varying number of spa-
tially distinct nodes per network. For each node, sepa-
rately for each participant and each functional run, we
generated a single timecourse by taking a weighted
average using that node’s ﬁnal downsampled map.
Again separately for each participant and functional
run, we computed all pairwise Pearson correlations
between nodes. These correlation values were all
Fisher z-transformed, and within-participant contrasts
were computed by taking the diﬀerence between the
relevant connectivity matrices for each contrast. Finally,
gross network-network results were computed using
a multi-level model run in R using lmer, with an inter-
cept varying across network-interaction level as a ﬁxed
eﬀect as well as a random intercept across participants.
The resulting network-interaction intercepts and their
standard errors are taken as summaries of the intra- and
inter-network changes in connectivity across functional
runs. Because these were planned analyses, we do not
correct for multiple comparisons. We use the notation
T below to refer to the ratio of a beta with its standard
error, and although this is not a proper Student’s
t statistic, we conservatively compare against the critical




A total of 22 participants reported having understood the
distinction between the terms ‘functional’ and ‘anatomi-
cal,’ while seven participants did not understand the
meaning of the terms. Two participants who reported
having become suspicious at some point during scan
were excluded from analysis. The ﬁnal sample included
9 males and 18 females (age range 18–22 years).
A priori connectivity results
Figure 1–3 show the results of our contrasts within our
set of a priori networks of interest. Contrast 1 was based
on data collected in Study 1, and reﬂects the diﬀerence
between the ‘Structural’ and Functional scans. Using
the results of the multi-level model to identify signiﬁ-
cant network-level results, this contrast revealed no
signiﬁcant changes between scans (although the
change in connectivity between the AC and SC was
close, at T = 2.01). This ﬁnding suggests that merely
Figure 1. Connectivity results for contrast 1 between the study 1 functional and ‘structural’ scans. The upper triangle and right
colorbar reﬂect eﬀect sizes (mean/std) for each network-level region of the matrix, while the lower triangle and left colorbar show
t-values (calculated as a one-sample t test within a given node-node pair across participants for contrast 1) for each individual
node–node edge. Nodes within each network are ordered according to decreasing cluster size for the corresponding node.
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being in an fMRI scanner and having a functional brain
scan does not substantially modulate these brain net-
works diﬀerentially compared with being in a scanner
and believing that your brain is being scanned
anatomically.
Contrast 2 was based on data collected in Study 2,
and examined changes in brain activity between its
‘Structural’ and Functional scans. As with Contrast 1,
there were no signiﬁcant changes in network-network
connectivity amongst the networks we investigated
here (although again, one pair, namely AC with EC,
was close, with T = 2.02).
Contrast 3 examined changes between the Study 1
Functional scan and the Study 2 Functional scan. The
Figure 2. Connectivity results for contrast 2 between the study 2 functional and ‘structural’ scans. All conventions as in Figure 1.
Figure 3. Connectivity results for contrast 3 between the study 1 functional scan and the study 2 functional scan. All conventions as
in Figure 1.
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results for this contrast diﬀer starkly compared to the
ﬁrst two, insofar as there are only a few network pairs
that fail to reach signiﬁcance. For the AC network, the
changes in connectivity with the EC network (T = 3.45),
SR network (T = 3.11), and TM network (T = 2.22), as
well as AC’s change in intrinsic connectivity (T = 3.61)
are all signiﬁcant. Additionally, the EC network evinced
signiﬁcant changes with itself (T = 2.33) and every other
network (SC: T = 2.58; SR: T = 2.84; TM: T = 2.77). Finally,
the changes in connectivity both within the SC network
(T = 2.22) as well as with the remaining networks (SR:
T = 2.20; TM: T = 2.22) are signiﬁcant.
Discussion
Our results contribute two novel ﬁndings. First, they
demonstrate that merely providing an instructional
manipulation emphasizing the degree to which a scan
has the potential to observe (thought-related) brain
activity is suﬃcient to cause changes in functional con-
nectivity within and between relevant brain networks.
This ﬁnding continues earlier work demonstrating the
range of monitoring technology to which participants
are sensitive, including a stationary camera (Van
Rompay et al., 2009), a web-cam (Gallup et al., 2016),
or eye-tracking equipment (Nasiopoulos et al., 2015;
Risko & Kingstone, 2011).
It is important to consider the extent to which the
present results reﬂect a social eﬀect (e.g. ‘these other
social agents can see what I am thinking’) or
a recording eﬀect (e.g. ‘this machine can record what
I am thinking’). While the present design does not
aﬀord a deﬁnitive test, recent research has demon-
strated that implied presence manipulations, similar to
those used here, do seem to depend explicitly on their
social implications. For example, Gobel, Kim, and
Richardson (2015) demonstrated that implied presence
eﬀects are abolished when people believe that camera
recordings will not be viewed by another person. And
more recently, Gallup et al. (2019) have shown that
presence eﬀects are eliminated when an avatar in an
immersive virtual reality (VR) environment is not
a stand-in for a real person, or similarly, a webcam
situated within VR environment is not transmitting
a recording that can be viewed by an actual person.
Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that the present
ﬁndings are social in nature (i.e. people believed that
their brain activity would be observed by another per-
son). We hasten to add, however, that one outstanding
question for future investigation is whether an implied
social presence eﬀect on overt and covert behaviours
are mediated by the same or diﬀerent mechanisms. For
instance, it is possible that unlike the implied social
presence eﬀect of a camera on overt behaviour, which
may be mediated by a ‘spotlight eﬀect’ – that is, the
tendency for people to overestimate the extent to
which their behavior is evaluated by others – the pre-
sence eﬀect of fMRI technology on covert brain activity
may be mediated by a diﬀerent cognitive bias known as
an ‘illusion of transparency’, which results in people
overestimating the extent to which their internal
thoughts are apparent to other people. Note that in
both cases, a common link is the importance of the
‘social other’ (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999).
Second, our results elucidate the neural correlates of
implied social presence in ﬁve relevant brain networks,
namely, networks that have been previously associated
selectively with attentional and executive control, as
well as self-relevant processing, social cognition, and
theory of mind. Our results suggest that instructional
manipulations are not guaranteed to cause changes in
the patterns of connectivity within and between these
networks, as demonstrated by the lack of signiﬁcant
network-level connectivity changes in Contrasts 1 and
2 (although the lack of signiﬁcance in these contrasts
could reﬂect smaller eﬀects that fail to achieve signiﬁ-
cance given our sample size). However, given instruc-
tions that more explicitly refer to the invasive nature of
the technology, there were widespread signiﬁcant
changes in network-level connectivity patterns, invol-
ving all ﬁve examined networks. From this perspective
it will be important to consider the nature of the neural
mechanisms activated by the idea that one’s thoughts
are being monitored by another social agent.
One interesting possibility is that individuals actively
monitor their thoughts and attempt to suppress certain
classes of thoughts, for example, thoughts the indivi-
dual might deem ‘embarrassing’ or in some manner
socially unacceptable. There is an extensive literature
in psychology on thought suppression which has typi-
cally demonstrated a paradoxical increase in the to-be-
suppressed thought (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, &
White, 1987). Previous fMRI studies of this phenomenon
have identiﬁed activity in regions that the authors
claimed reﬂected cognitive control, such as the anterior
cingulate and dorsolateral PFC (Mitchell et al., 2007;
Wyland, Kelley, Macrae, Gordon, & Heatherton, 2003).
Unfortunately, from these studies (which focused on
activation), it is diﬃcult to predict how functional con-
nectivity might be modiﬁed due to thought suppres-
sion. Our design also does not allow us to distinguish
between changes that are due to alterations in the
underlying thoughts per se (either paradoxical increases
due to attempted suppression or attempts to focus
one’s thoughts on an unembarrasing topic), versus
changes in regions involved in monitoring/control.
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Note, however, that our goal was not to resolve these
possibilities, and indeed, we do not regard the possibi-
lity that our results reﬂect (at least in part) thought
suppression as a limitation. We are interested in the
neural analog of the behavioral changes participants
exhibit when they are being outwardly observed.
However they manage that – for instance, whether
they engage in a strategy of attempting to suppress
certain types of thoughts in response to our instruc-
tions, or focus their thoughts elsewhere – they are
nonetheless doing so because they believe their
thoughts are being monitored. We look forward to
future research that seeks explicitly to identify the
eﬀects of brain/thought monitoring to disentangle
these (and likely other) potential mechanisms.
One other observation emerges from our work,
with potentially far-reaching consequences, with the
caveat that this issue was not something our study
was explicitly designed to address – and that is, all
fMRI studies are subject to the sort of eﬀect we
describe here (again, whether it is due to implied
social presence or some other mechanism).
Although the eﬀects were nonsigniﬁcant for the
mildest instructional conditions (which likely repli-
cates the norm for most studies), our results may
nonetheless be a cause for concern in three speciﬁc
situations. First, all studies of resting-state fMRI may
carry a weak trace of this observation eﬀect signal
(which may emerge when aggregating across the
many studies that have examined the resting state
in recent years). This is not necessarily a confound,
but it is at the very least something researchers
should be aware of, and perhaps would prefer to
minimize by using instructions that do not accent-
uate the observational or social nature of
fMRI. Second, all studies that are interested in social
processes and therefore (intentionally and by neces-
sity) activate social concepts in their participants are
likely to also be activating the sorts of processes we
describe here, whether intentionally or not. And
third, any study that draws from a population that
might be especially susceptible to the phenomenon
described here – for instance, individuals with delu-
sions of observation or those with social anxiety –
might be particularly inﬂuenced by changes related
to this observation eﬀect, rather than whatever pro-
cess the experimenters intended to study. However,
as our study was designed to discover if fMRI trig-
gered a presence eﬀect rather than to elucidate such
an eﬀect’s neural underpinnings, we describe these
possibilities only as reasonable inferences based on
our results, and propose that they warrant further
investigation.
These results lay the groundwork for future researchers
interested in understanding the neural and cognitive
eﬀects of implied social presence and invasivemonitoring
technologies. They also serve as a caution for researchers
interested in studying other processes without contam-
ination from processes related to implied social presence,
and suggest that these researchers should ensure that
their instructions to participants are relatively minimal,
so as to avoid invoking processes and concerns of mind-
reading in their participants. Especially as the technology
continues to improve and claims of fMRI’s mind-reading
potential become more widely (mis)reported in the pop-
ular press, it will become increasingly important for
researchers to be aware of the eﬀects that their measure-
ment tool have on the object of their measurement itself.
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